The Children and Families Act 2014 pursues the twin policies of increasing the number of children adopted out of compulsory state care and reducing the scope for court-ordered contact between such children and their birth families.
5
existing specific obligation to "give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background" in England. 29 That said, the Explanatory Notes to the Act emphasise that a local authority "will remain under a duty to have regard to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background, amongst other factors, where relevant", 30 and that the reform is merely "intended to avoid any suggestion that the current legislation places a child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background above the factors" listed elsewhere in the 2002 Act. 31 The 2014 Act additionally aims to increase co-operation between adoption agencies in recruiting, assessing and approving prospective adopters, 32 and to reform adoption support services. 33 The Government has claimed that it is not its intention that "kinship carers should be overlooked as a consequence of the clause in [what was then] the Bill concerning fostering for adoption". 34 Interested parties including the Children's Commissioner and the Joint Committee on
Human Rights expressed concern that this would in fact be the effect of the original Bill, 35 although it contained different drafting. 36 In any case, it is not clear that the current drive towards increasing the number of adoptions is consistent with Lord Neuberger's recent assertion in the Supreme Court that the "adoption of a child against her parents' wishes should only be contemplated as a last resort -when all else fails", 37 which has already been very influential (alongside similar assertions) in the lower courts. 38 On Lord Neuberger's analysis, "the court must be satisfied that there is no practical 30 Explanatory Notes to the Children and Families Act 2014, at [56] . 31 Ibid., at [57] . . 33 Children and Families Act 2014, ss. 5-6. 34 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Children and Families Bill; Energy Bill, p. 3. 35 Ibid., p. 3; paras.
[13]- [22] . 36 Cf. Children and Families Bill 2012-13 as introduced into the House of Commons, cl. 1(3). 37 Re way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support" to render adoption unnecessary. 39 It is telling that the Select Committee on Adoption Legislation ("SCAL") has urged the Government "not to undermine the potential benefit of preventative programmes by focusing on adoption at the expense of early intervention", and expressed concern that "the Government's focus on adoption risks disadvantaging those children in care for whom adoption is not suitable". 40 Nevertheless, the Committee also agreed with the Government's position that "there is scope to increase the number of children benefitting from adoption". 41 The focus of this article is on decisions not about whether adoption should occur in the first place, but about contact between the adoptee and his birth family once the adoption has occurred. It could be argued, however, that the insistence on promoting adoption as a solution for looked-after children only increases the importance of recognising the link between birth parent and adopted child in appropriate cases notwithstanding the severance of the relevant legal parenthood. In spite of this, the next section of this article demonstrates that the Government has not taken this attitude. It is necessary to begin with an analysis of law and practice as they stand pending the entry into force of the post-adoption contact provisions in the 2014 Act. Historically, post-adoption contact was effectively considered to be anathema to the nature of adoption. The prevailing view, as J.C.
III. POST-ADOPTION CONTACT

A. Current Law & Practice
Hall expressed it in 1987, was that "continued access by a natural parent is repugnant to the purpose of adoption, which is to effect the complete legal transplant of the child from one family to another". 42 There has, however, been something of a move towards "open adoption", 43 involving the freer exchange of information between the parties to an adoption as an alternative to the secrecy that traditionally characterised the process, which has called into question the "transplant" model. 44 While the SCAL claims that practice on the issue "varies considerably", 45 "[m]ost children now adopted in England and Wales are planned to have some form of contact with members of their birth family", 46 reflecting the increasing age of adopted children, the consequent fact that more of them will remember, and/or become curious about, their birth families, and the perceived benefits of post-adoption contact. 47 Contact of this sort will usually take an indirect form, 48 such as letterbox contact, which one adoption agency defines as "an arrangement where adoptive parents, birth families and adopted children agree to exchange letters, photographs, cards and/or gift vouchers", mediated by the agency. 49 But in spite of the pragmatic approach taken by adoption agencies, courts remained resistant to the imposition of such contact against the wishes of the adoptive family. 50 Since the 2002 Act obliges the court to consider "whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact with the child" before making an adoption order, 51 66 which specifically directs the court to consider the effect of ceasing to be a member of the birth family and the child's relationships with relatives as aspects of the child's welfare. 67 It also confirmed that post-adoption contact was not directly subjected to the change in the importance of welfare heralded by the 2002 Act, whereby it became the "paramount" rather than merely the "first" consideration in relation to certain decisions as regards adoption. 
70
The test for the substantive decision on post-adoption contact differed significantly from that applied when granting permission to apply for such contact before the advent of the 2014 Act. As the law stands before the entry into force of the Act's post-adoption contact provisions, the leave of the court is required where (as in Re J) the natural parents make a free-standing application for postadoption contact after the adoption order occurs rather than making one simultaneously with the application for the adoption order, since they are no longer legal parents in the former scenario. On the facts of Re J, the Court refused to order that the natural parents who had consented to the adoption of their infant should receive and retain an annual photograph of the child in the face of opposition from the adoptive parents. Priority was given to the stability of the placement in the light of the adoptive parents' fears that it could be disrupted by the retention of the photographs, in spite of the fact that the judge below had described those fears as "understandable but rather farfetched". 74 Dr. Hughes and I criticised the decision for failing adequately to distinguish the welfare of the child from the wishes of the adoptive parents, as well as giving insufficient consideration to international human rights norms. 75 Re J does not mean that an opposed post-adoption contact application will never succeed under the pre-2014 Act law. that the relevant child's "welfare throughout his life requires the maintenance of a relationship with his maternal grandmother and sister through whom there will be a relationship with his extended birth family". 78 Ryder L.J. held that the adoption and contact orders were "inextricably linked on the facts of this case", that both orders were "necessary", and that the "success of the adoption order is in part dependent upon a minimum level of contact with [the child's] birth family[,] particularly his sister and maternal grandmother". 79 Ryder L.J.'s assessment of the evidence is admirable, but his judgment might legitimately be criticised for failing to engage with the details of the case law.
He did cite Re R and Re J, but he also cited Re P and omitted to explain precisely how MF was sufficiently "unusual" to merit departure from Lord Neuberger's default approach. 80 It may also be significant that the relevant child was older than the one in Re J, and that in MF contact was ordered not with the child's birth parents but with other members of the family.
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While cases are self-evidently fact-dependent, Re J must ultimately be taken as representing the dominant legal position before the modifications heralded by the 2014 Act, such that it will be "extremely unusual" for post-adoption contact to be ordered against the wishes of the adoptive parents. As it stands, the law therefore diverges significantly from social work practice, moves close to imposing a presumption against ordered contact, takes a rather narrow view of a child's best interests and carries an air of futility since an order is unlikely to be made in the very sort of case where it is most likely to be necessary. Indeed, one judge has recently referred to the "exceptional nature of contact orders together with adoption orders". 82 It will be seen in the next section, however, that this position was still apparently insufficiently limiting for the Government and one of its prominent advisors. 
B. Reforms in the Children and Families Act: The New Sections 51A and 51B of the 2002 Act
Changes are made to the law on post-adoption contact by the Children and Families Act. Section 9 of the Act inserts new sections 51A and 51B concerning post-adoption contact into the 2002 Act.
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Some changes to post-adoption contact would be necessary as a result of the 2014 Act's abolition of "residence" and "contact" orders under the section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (generally used for a child whose parents do not live together but remain both remain legal parents) and their replacement with a single "child arrangements order". 84 Indeed, it is logical that the 2002 Act's specific assertion that the provisions governing contact during placement for adoption do not "prevent an application for a contact order under section 8 of the 1989 Act being made where the application is to be heard together with an application for an adoption order" is removed by the Act. 85 Other, more substantive, changes are also made, in spite of the SCAL's assertion that it had received no evidence that any change to the legislative framework was required. 86 A significant limitation of its report, however, is that its evidence hearings were concluded before the specific text of the proposed sections 51A and 51B were published.
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Several of the provisions in the Act reflect the view expressed in the foreword to the relevant Government consultation paper by Sir Martin Narey, the ministerial adviser on adoption known for his "unequivocally pro-adoption" stance, 88 that post-adoption contact "harms children too often". 89 That paper proceeded to suggest legislative change without any real consideration of the courts' current approach to ordering post-adoption contact, and the Government retained its view on the need for change in several respects after the consultation process culminating in the relevant aspects of the Children and Families Act. 90 This was in spite of the fact that in extensive empirical work Neil et al found "little evidence that birth family contact has any great impact on children's general development". 91 While acknowledging that "contact, even when wanted, can be a mixed experience" for adopted children, 92 they cited evidence that adopted children remaining in touch with birth relatives "in general…emerged as young adults with a sense of belonging in their new family and a realistic view of their birth family", 93 and that many who were unhappy about contact felt as they did because it had stopped or because they did not have contact with particular birth relatives. 94 Most significantly, Neil et al emphasised the value of "individualised decisionmaking", and argued that there was "no need to change legislation in the direction of restricting contact", 95 albeit that they did make suggestions for improvement in practice. 96 They went so far as to express concern that "a return to the more closed adoption practices of the past could actually bring about an increase in unmediated and unsolicited contact between children and their birth relatives".
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In any case, where a local authority has placed or was authorised to place a child for adoption, 98 the 2014 Act gives the court a specific power to make an order concerning postadoption contact "[w]hen making the adoption order or at any time afterwards" (effectively replacing the current mechanism of the section 8 contact order). 99 The new post-adoption contact order could be positive, "requiring" the adoptive parents "to allow the child to visit or stay with the person named in the order…, or for the person named in that order and the child otherwise to have contact with each other". 100 But it could also be negative, "prohibiting the person named in the order…from having contact with the child", 101 and it could be made subject to "any conditions the court thinks appropriate". 102 The person "named in the order", i.e. the person on whom the right to contact is conferred or who is prohibited from having contact, must fall into a recognised category. 106 the local authority was authorised to place the child, 107 and a person with whom the child has lived for at least a year in certain circumstances. 108 The framing of the category including blood relatives is interesting given the general attitude to the birth family displayed the Act, since surely the birth family remain related to the child by blood irrespective of the child's adoption.
Significantly, while the adoptive parents 109 and the child 110 could apply for the new order without leave (presumably largely for the purposes of applying for a negative order in the case of the adoptive parents), all other applicants including the birth parents would be obliged to seek leave to apply for the new post-adoption contact order from the court. This removes the distinction as regards leave currently in place between a contact application made simultaneously with an adoption application and one made in subsequent proceedings, such that the change is at least rational. But it arguably prejudices the child's relationship with birth parents still further.
In a reform that is at least symbolically important, when deciding whether to grant leave to apply for post-adoption contact under the proposed section 51A(5), the court would be placed under a specific obligation to consider "any risk there might be of the proposed application disrupting the child's life to such an extent that he or she would be harmed by it", , mirroring the previous language in the more limited circumstances where leave was required but without including the nature of the application. This could be seen as a further setback for "open adoption". In addition to these considerations, the court must unsurprisingly take account of the applicant's "connection with the child" 111 and "any representations made to the court" by the child or the adoptive parents. insisted that what is now the Act enables birth parents and relatives "to apply to the court for contact orders where they feel it is necessary, and where such contact would genuinely be helpful and beneficial to the child". 116 The reduction was pursued in spite of the SCAL's conclusion, while recognising that disruption can be damaging, that there was "general agreement" among its sources of evidence that legislation could not "provide a suitable for remedy" for such disruption where it occurred. 117 This, in turn, was consistent with Neil et al's response to the original consultation exercise, and there is a significant chance that the changes to permission would either have no effect or have more of an effect than was intended.
It would of course be ridiculous for a judge steadfastly to avoid considering the risk specified in section 51A(5) even under the pre-2014 Act law, and the fact that the ordering of postadoption contact is currently limited to "extremely unusual" cases arguably minimises the practical effect of the reform and may render it pointless. Moreover, the change introduced by the Act in relation to post-adoption contact is less dramatic than its dilution of the duty to promote contact while the child is merely in foster care. 118 It also falls short of the formal presumption against postadoption contact (once it is clear that a child will be adopted) that was originally proposed. 119 On the other hand, the Act's inclusion of the instruction about disruption in spite of its clear relevance under the current law, combined with the reasonable assumption on the part of future 16 interpreters that section 9 is intended to have some substantive effect, risks suggesting that postadoption contact should be ordered even less readily that it already is, and even suggesting that local authorities should not encourage it where it does not need to be ordered as they currently do.
At the Committee Stage in the House of Lords, Baroness Hamwee admirably attempted to balance the proposed section 51A by inserting an express requirement that the court consider "the benefit to the child of an order" for post-adoption contact when deciding upon a leave application. 120 She was persuaded to withdraw her proposed amendment by a Government whip on the basis that the potential benefit of post-adoption contact is already to be considered by virtue of the welfare principle in section 1 of the 2002 Act and of an assertion (made without reference to any source) that contact is harmful for twice as many children as for whom it is beneficial. But the danger of over-interpretation of the distinctly negative emphasis in the section is particularly acute given that the instruction about considering harm relates to the increased need to consider leave and the mere application for post-adoption contact, jeapordising the legitimately low threshold exemplified by Re B, and not even to the substantive decision taken on the full merits of the case.
An analogy can be drawn with the Family Justice Review's concerns about a proposed legislative presumption (outside the context of adoption) that a child's welfare is furthered through the involvement of both parents in his life, albeit that in that case a presumption of some sort appears on the face of the Act. 121 The Government pursued that reform in spite of the Review's misgivings that legislative change of this sort could create a "perception that there is a parental right to substantially shared or equal time for both parents", 122 citing the Australian experience of such a change. 123 A balancing and clarifying amendment was at least successfully added to the relevant section, 124 contrasting with the fate of Baroness Hamwee's amendment on post-adoption contact.
The court will be able to make a negative post-adoption contact order of its own motion under the Act when making an adoption order, but cannot make a positive one in that way. 125 The inability to make an order for contact on its own initiative, when taken alongside the restrictive leave requirements that will be imposed on birth parents by the Act, rather dilutes the court's duty 120 to "consider whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact with the child" before making an adoption order. 126 Admittedly, however, a court would be unlikely seriously to consider ordering contact where no-one had made an application for it. By analogy with the courts' approach to contact with a non-resident legal parent, 127 it is unlikely to be thought generally workable or consistent with a child's best interests to order contact between that child and someone who did not want to have such contact, and Marshall has sought to defend a mother's right to privacy and anonymity in relation to adoption following a concealed birth. 128 That said, it would be odd if birth parents were to be given the near-veto on post-adoption contact that I have argued should not be given to adoptive parents, and ordering indirect contact with a reluctant birth parent could conceivably be appropriate in some cases in a way that ordering direct contact is unlikely to be.
Of course, there are some adopted children for whom even indirect and infrequent contact with birth family members would be inappropriate, particularly if they have suffered intentional abuse at the hands of such people. There are other, less relationship-oriented, means through which such children can receive information about their biological origins than contact of any form. 129 But where parenting has been "merely" negligent or deficient, perhaps as a result of mental illness, it is surely appropriate at least to investigate whether the ordering of post-adoption contact would serve the long-term interests of the particular child and (to a lesser extent) 130 the birth parents, rather than simply following the wishes of the adoptive parents in almost all cases and reducing the power of the courts as the Act arguably does. It is significant that Sir Martin Narey suggested to the SACL that "the notion that adopted children belong to another family with whom contact must be maintained was disconcerting and hurtful to adoptive parents and off-putting to potential adopters". 131 His view goes some way to explaining his surprisingly explicit suggestion in his foreword to the relevant Government consultation document that "birth family contact, including letterbox contact, should only take place when the adoptive parents", and not apparently the court, are "satisfied that it continues to be in the interests of their child". 132 Implausibly, the main body of the paper similarly asserted that "[a]ny further contact between their child and their child's birth parents is now a matter exclusively for the adoptive family", albeit that at least it almost immediately conceded that "[a]doptive parents are only obligated to maintain contact where a contact order has been made". 133 Sir Martin's view could place such adoptive parents in a stronger position than all other types of parent once a matter concerning a child's upbringing comes before a court, putting this area at odds with the rest of child law. The reforms in the Children and Families Act, however (if they are to have any substantive effect), create the risk that genuine investigations on the appropriateness of ordered post-adoption contact in the cases of individual children will occur even less frequently than they do under the current law, and that would clearly bring law and practice even further out of line unless local authorities were extremely strongly influenced by the policy messages sent out by the Act.
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C. A Human Rights Audit
It is unfortunate that the Joint Committee on Human Rights did not consider the proposed sections 51A and 51B in depth in its legislative scrutiny report on the Children and Families Bill. 142 The present sub-section of this article, however, considers the reforms from a human rights standpoint. 
The European Convention on Human Rights
An adoption order is a clear prima facie infringement of the child's and the natural parents' Article 8 rights to respect for family life, albeit one that can be justified under Article 8(2). Lady Hale and In Aune v Norway, also decided after the English Court of Appeal gave judgment in Re J, the European Court was presented with a case from a legal system where post-adoption contact could not be ordered at all and would inevitably be left to the discretion of the adoptive parents.
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On the facts of the case, all of the domestic organs had found that there was "almost absolute" 22 not result in 'cutting him off from his roots' with respect to contact with his biological mother".
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The Court also held, however, that the domestic authorities "could reasonably consider that the applicant's interest in maintaining a legal right of contact was outweighed by the interest in authorising adoption". 159 It was therefore satisfied that "the decision to deprive the applicant of parental responsibilities and to authorise the adoption was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and, bearing in mind the national margin of appreciation, was proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting [the child's] best interests". 160 This indirectly suggests that a lack of post-adoption contact could in principle breach Article 8, but again the matter is far from clear and the decision might also suggest that the European Convention imposes no obligation for a state even to provide a mechanism whereby post-adoption can be ordered. Like R and H, moreover, Aune was significantly concerned with the broader issue of adoption itself in the absence of parental consent. 161 Finally, while IS v Germany involves post-adoption contact, 162 only the Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties appear to be available at the time of writing and it can provide no further guidance on this issue.
Where a child is taken into state care (but not adopted), the Strasbourg Court has emphasised that "a measure as radical as the total severance of contact" with a parent can also be justified "only in exceptional circumstances", 163 and that "any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child". 164 In the light of its strong opposition to severing a child from its roots through adoption other than in the most exceptional circumstances, 165 it would be undesirable on policy grounds for the European Court retrospectively to increase the magnitude of interference with an Article 8 right caused by an adoption by holding that it eliminated "family life" that had previously existed. Paradoxically, however, the court's own emphasis on the draconian and exceptional nature of adoption as regards family life may well have made it more difficult to sustain an argument that family life for the purposes of Article 8 subsists after adoption occurs.
In any case, the Court's approach to adoption in general is distinctly ambivalent. In YC v United Kingdom, the majority of Court asserted both that "in cases concerning the placing of a child for adoption, which entails the permanent severance of family ties, the best interests of the child are paramount", and that "family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and…everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to 'rebuild' the family". 166 Lord Wilson, for his part, has described the decision as demonstrating "the high degree of justification which article 8 demands of a determination that a child should be adopted or placed in care with a view to adoption", 167 but post-adoption contact was not directly addressed in the judgment in YC.
One case in which an adopted person sought to invoke a right to respect for family life with a birth family post-adoption was Odièvre v France. 168 The applicant challenged the French system of anonymous births which prevented her from accessing information about her natural mother. She argued that "her request for information about strictly personal aspects of her history and childhood came within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention" and that "[e]stablishing her basic identity was an integral part not only of her 'private life', but also of her 'family life' with her natural family, with whom she hoped to establish emotional ties…". 169 This was contested by the French Government, which argued that "the guarantee of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 presupposed the existence of a family", and that the case law required there "to be at the very least close personal ties". 170 Applying this to the facts of Odièvre, the Government argued that "no family life within the meaning of Article 8…existed between the applicant and her natural mother", on the basis that, "the applicant had never met her mother, while the latter had at no point expressed any interest in the applicant or regarded her as her child". 169 Ibid., at [25] . 170 Ibid., at [26] . 171 Ibid.
24
consider the case "from the perspective of private life, not family life, since the applicant's claim… is based on her inability to gain access to information about her origins". 172 The Court in Odièvre found that the private life provision in Article 8 was applicable although it afforded a wide margin of appreciation to the state and found that the right had not been violated in this case. This analysis, while more concerned with information than contact, fits with
Harris-Short's contention that it is easier to fit post-adoption contact within "private life" as compared to "family life", 173 and the European Court has explicitly asserted that close relationships short of "family life" would generally fall within the scope of "private life". 174 Dr. Hughes and I have discussed the "private life" implications of post-adoption contact in detail elsewhere. be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by" that Article. 176 While the fact that the restriction on hearings is at least formally based on a perceived harm to a child might ultimately mean that the interference can be justified under Article 8(2), and the existence of Article 8 rights between adopter and adoptee must be borne in mind, 177 this will be a matter for ripe debate once the post-adoption contact provisions in the Children and Families Act come into effect.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
Unlike the ECHR, the UNCRC as a whole has not yet been incorporated into English law, 178 which is a state of affairs that continues to cause concern for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child to provide a much stricter and less subjective qualification than 'best interests'", although they concede that consideration of what is "possible" must include consideration of "best interests". 186 In addition to Article 7, Article 8(1) obliges states to respect a child's right to his or her identity and "family relations". It is limited to those relations recognised by law and purports to prohibit only "unlawful" interference, but this has not prevented the Committee on the Rights of the Child from criticising states' approach to identity even when the relevant rules are enshrined in national law. 187 Logically, Hodgkin and Newell do not consider that a state could use its own national law substantially to limit the scope of this right. 188 A similar argument could be made in relation to Article 7, which requires states to "ensure the implementation of the[ ] rights [it confers] in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments". 189 Moreover, Article 9 mandates states to ensure that "a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child". 190 Those best interests, in turn, can be determined only via due consideration of the child's relationship with the parents.
A complication as regards the rights of a child post-adoption is the following declaration, made by the UK Government upon ratification of the Convention:
The United Kingdom interprets the references in the Convention to "parents" to mean only those persons who, as a matter of national law, are treated as parents. This includes cases where the law regards a child as having only one parent, for example where a child has been adopted by one person only… 191 On this interpretation, any reference to "parents" apparently becomes a reference to the adoptive parents, and not the birth parents, once an adoption order is (validly) made. 192 Nevertheless, this declaration could in itself be said to jeopardise the child's right to establish his identity even if it is not possible for his birth parents to care for him or her. This is similar to the difficulty that exists as regards the survival of Article 8 ECHR rights to respect for family life as between birth parent and child post-adoption, discussed in the previous sub-section.
In any event, post-adoption contact with birth relatives is particularly relevant in the light of the child's UNCRC rights to preserve his identity and (subject to the UK's declaration on the meaning of "parents") to know his parents, and the Committee has recently expressed concern about an Israeli statute that "allows hiding from a child the fact that he or she has been adopted". 193 Post-adoption contact could be seen as a way of protecting a child's identity-related rights in cases where adoption was deemed necessary in order to secure the outcome consistent with the best interests of the child.
Moreover, Article 9(3) of the UNCRC obliges states to "respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests". This provision would again be subject to the UK's declaration on the meaning of "parents", and Article 9 is not specifically aimed at full adoption. But Hodgkin and Newell cite poverty being a ground for adoption as an example of a provision that was incompatible with Article 9. 194 They also deem "simple" adoption 195 to be a practice within the scope of Article 9, 196 and make several references to Article 9 in the Handbook's chapter on Article 21. 197 It also seems particularly appropriate to apply Article 9 to English adoption law, since there it has effectively become an extension of, or an alternative to, the care system. In any case, continuity of upbringing for the purposes of Article 20 has been interpreted to include contact with family members where the child has been adopted. 198 However, the English courts' approach to post-adoption contact again has the potential to bring them into conflict with the UNCRC, in spite of Lord Neuberger's subsequent emphasis on the importance of the UNCRC in Re B. Admittedly and inevitably, the Court of Appeal in Re J did attempt to justify their conclusion on the basis of the child's welfare, but we have seen that the decision was extremely deferential to the adoptive parents. Lord Neuberger's judgment in that case did not self-evidently demonstrate that that limited contact was "contrary" to the child's best interests as prima facie required by Article 9 given the other interests protected by the Convention, even if a supportable conclusion was reached on the facts. The restrictions in the Children and Families Act, apparently aimed at limiting circumstances where a full hearing on post-adoption contact will occur, clearly create further difficulties in this regard.
The restrictions on the availability of a full hearing also have the potential to prejudice the child's rights under Article 12 of the UNCRC. That Article requires state parties to "assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child". 199 There is also a more specific right to "be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law". 200 This is clearly a qualified right limited with reference to national law, and a child would be able to make representations on whether or not a birth parent should be given leave to apply for a post-adoption contact order. That said, the substance of the right to be heard might well be difficult to confer upon a child if the likelihood of a full hearing on the merits of post-adoption contact is reduced following the Act's passing. It is significant that the Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasised the particular importance of Article 12 in the general context of adoption, "the 'best interests' of the child cannot be defined without consideration of the child's views".
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Once an adopted child has reached the age of 18, he can choose to be placed on an 
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rights while that person remains a child, particularly given the lack of a clear entitlement to be told that he or she is adopted 203 or a willingness to order contact where the adoptive parents are opposed.
There are therefore several respects in which the compatibility of the both the pre-existing law (taken to include both legislative and judicial elements) and the 2014 Act with the UNCRC is open to question. That said, it has is also clear that there are weaknesses and conflicts inherent in the Convention itself, since it fails to provide, in Alston's words, "a specific and readily ascertainable recipe for resolving the inevitable tensions and conflicts that arise in a given situation among the different rights recognized". 204 Whatever one's view of the merits of adoption and postadoption contact, the difficult process of implementing the UNCRC cannot easily be considered complete in England and Wales merely because the best interests of the child are expressed to be the paramount consideration in post-adoption decisions. 205 
IV. CONCLUSION
The twin reforms in the Children and Families Act of procuring more adoptions out of care and purporting to be even more cautious about ordering post-adoption contact might have a certain logic to them. Indeed, they are consistent with the older philosophy that if adoption is truly appropriate, post-adoption contact is unlikely to be so. They are not, however, consistent with modern ideas about open adoption, or assertions like that in MF to the effect that adoption and contact afterwards can be complementary rather than antagonistic. 206 Moreover, they are not clearly underpinned by solid empirical evidence. If the state continues to insist on severing the legal ties between increasing numbers of its biologically related citizens, it should surely be all the more careful to preserve their de facto relationships when appropriate. Ultimately, the post-adoption contact reforms in the Children and Families Act either reflect the current law (in which case they are unnecessary and represent law reform for rhetorical purposes and without due consideration of the pre-existing law)
or they risk introducing more of an effective presumption against post-adoption contact, which is 203 See, e.g., Committee on the Rights of the Child, "Consideration of Reports Submitted by State[ ] Parties under
